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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the optimality of allowing ﬁrms to observe
signals of workers’ characteristics in an optimal taxation framework.
We show that it is always optimal to prohibit signals that disclose
information about diﬀerences in the intrinsic productivities of workers
like mandatory health exams and IQ tests, for example. On the other
hand, it is never optimal to forbid signals that reveal information
about the comparative advantages of workers like their specialization
and profession. When signals are mixed (they disclose both types of
information), there is a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity. It is
optimal to prohibit signals with suﬃciently low comparative advantage
content.
Introduction
There is a controversial debate about the rights of ﬁrms to impose mandatory
exams on workers. In the U.S., a supreme court decision limits the use
of employment tests that are not directly relevant for the job (Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 3 FEP Cases 175, 1971). There are also a series of Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines about employee selection
procedures (U.S. Department of Labor, 1978).
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1This dispute has been in the core of political discussions at least since the
1940’s, when the U.S. Army began screening draftees for their ability to read
and write. Worried about the disproportion of black and white individuals’
who were able to pass the literacy test, Southern Congressman demanded
the Army to relax the passing standards.
Nevertheless, economists have not devoted suﬃcient attention to this is-
sue. Since the work of Akerlof (1970), it is known that the presence of
asymmetric information may lead to ineﬃcient outcomes. Then, most pol-
icy prescriptions suggest reducing the asymmety of information in order to
increase welfare. In this case, this would lead to allowing ﬁrms to obtain any
relevant information about workers.
Despite these recommendations, not only laws ban the requirement of
some exams but also some types of information that could be disclosed at
virtually no cost are not available. For instance, most exams are not graded in
suﬃciently detailed grading systems which would allow a clearer comparison
between students.1
Implicit in these prescriptions is a ﬁrst-best argument. The government
should ﬁrst try to correct the labor market ineﬃciency. Then, workers made
worse oﬀ can be compensated through lump-sum redistribution. However, as
has been widely studied in the public ﬁnance literature, the type of required
lump-sum taxes (varying person-by-person and independent of individual
behavior) is usually unfeasible. Instead, available taxes depend on observable
behavior and generate some distortion.
In this paper, we consider the optimality of banning the ﬁrms’ access to
signals which reﬂect workers’ characteristics in an environment where lump-
sum taxes are not available (due to asymmetric information). We consider
two types of signals: (i) productivity signals, and (ii) comparative advantage
signals.
The ﬁrst type of signals is the focus of most of the job-market signaling
literature and includes health exams, cognitive and non-cognitive tests. In
this model, ﬁrms have an identical technology but workers diﬀer in their
intrinsic productivity. Then, signals reveal each worker’s productivity to
ﬁrms. We show that it is always optimal to prohibit productivity signals
(such as health exams or IQ tests). Moreover, when they enhance workers’
productivities (as education or employer-sponsored health-care programs) it
is optimal to ban signals if and only if the productivity enhancing component
is below a certain threshold.
1Examples include pass-or-fail systems or letter grades. The pass-or-fail system is used
in the GED, for example, which is taken by more than 1 million people in the U.S. each
year. Most universities employ letter-grade systems.
2The reason for this result is that prohibiting the disclosure of information
about workers’ productivities approximates lump-sum redistributions better
than what can be implemented by the government when this information is
available to ﬁrms. However, this policy implies in the emergence of adverse
selection: since more (less) able individuals receive lower (higher) wages and
leisure is a normal good, there are less qualiﬁed (more unqualiﬁed) workers
than the socially optimal amount in equilibrium.
Our result is related to the second-best arguments of Lipsey and Lancaster
(1956). Eliminating the labor-market ineﬃciency would generate too much
inequality while increasing the aggregate income. Then, redistributing the
increased income would imply in much higher ineﬃciency.2
However, diﬀerently from usual job-market signaling models, education
generally signals more than just a worker’s productivity. Each profession
often signals a particular set of characteristics which are desirable for some
speciﬁc type of jobs. For example, a degree in design signals very diﬀerent
characteristics from a degree in accounting. Firms use this information in
the internal allocation of tasks. We call such signals comparative advantage
signals as they reﬂect diﬀerent comparative advantages instead of diﬀerent
intrinsic productivities among workers.
We show that a prohibition of comparative advantage signals is never
optimal. The reason for this result is that banning the disclosure of such
information would not redistribute wealth but would lead to ineﬃciencies in
the productive process. Thus, it would always be welfare reducing.
Therefore, the main conclusion of the paper is that an optimized econ-
omy with concerns about income distribution would prohibit signals that
reﬂect diﬀerent productivities among workers with suﬃciently homogenous
comparative advantages and permit signals that reﬂect diﬀerent comparative
advantages among workers with suﬃciently similar productivities.
When signals are mixed (i.e., they convey information about comparative
advantages and diﬀerent productivities), there is an equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ
as the prohibition of signals reduces aggregate production but redistributes
income. Hence, Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971) eﬃciency result does not hold
2This conclusion also resembles arguments presented at Elul (1995), Ghatak et al.
(2001), and Vercammen (2002) though applied to diﬀerent contexts. Elul proved that
in almost every incomplete markets economy with more than one consumption good and
suﬃciently uninsured states of nature, there is an asset whose introduction makes all agents
worse oﬀ. Gatak at al. showed that when labor markets feature suboptimal eﬀort (due to
moral harzard, for example), an increase in the ineﬃciency of credit markets may increase
welfare. Vercammen showed that in the pooling equilibrium of a model of simultaneous
adverse selection and moral hazard in a credit market, aggregate borrower welfare may be
higher than in the moral-hazard-only case.
3in this model since an optimized economy may not be in the production
frontier.
This article is related to the theory of optimal taxation initiated by Mir-
rlees (1971). However, unlike most articles in this literature, we do not
assume that ﬁrms have full knowledge about the productivities of workers
(or, equivalently, that individuals have access to a home production tech-
nology). Instead, ﬁrms progressively learn the workers’ productivities in our
model. This assumption is associated with a relatively new strand of litera-
ture on productivity learning and wage dynamics which has found signiﬁcant
empirical support [Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (1996)].
Two other papers have studied welfare eﬀects of taxing signals. An-
dersson (1996) showed that in the presence of linear income-taxation and
job-market signaling, imposing some tax on signals and progressive tax on
income may have favorable welfare consequences. Ireland (1994) presented a
model of status signals. His result is that taxing the signal and subsidizing
consumption may be Pareto improving.
Some papers have analyzed models of competitive insurance markets
where individuals may choose whether or not to gather and disclose infor-
mation. Doherty and Thistle (1996) considered the existence of equilibrium
and the welfare properties under several diﬀerent informational structures.
Hoy and Polborn (2000) presented a model of genetic tests in life insurance
competitive markets. Both papers obtained ambiguous results. Our paper
departs from Doherty and Thistle’s and Hoy and Polborn’s in that we al-
low the government to combine the regulation of access to information with
redistributive policies.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model with a
productivity signal. Section 2 considers a model with a comparative advan-
tage signal. Section 3 generalizes the results to the cases where the produc-
tivity signal enhances workers’ productivity and where signals are mixed and
discusses other possible extensions. Then, Section 4 concludes.
1 The Model with a Productivity Signal
Consider an economy that lasts for two periods, denoted 1 and 2. There is
an equal amount of two types of individuals, denoted H and L. Individuals
are identical except for their productivity parameters θ: L-workers are less
productive than H-workers (θ
L < θ
H).
3Autor and Scarborough (2004) empirically test the existence of an equality-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ in the adoption of standardized tests.







where l is the amount of labor. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms do not know each
worker’s productivity parameter θ. Hence, they are unable tocondition wages
on workers’ productivities. As in Holmstrom (1999), we assume that wages
must be paid before the end of the productive process implying that it cannot
be conditional on production.4
After the ﬁrst period, all ﬁrms observe the productivity of each worker.
Then, in period 2, ﬁrms may oﬀer wages conditional on the worker’s pro-
ductivity. The assumption that all ﬁrms observe each worker’s productivity
allows us to abstract from the wage bargaining process.5
As in most of the wage bargaining literature, we assume that ﬁrms cannot
commit to a two-period contract in the ﬁrst period. Thus, ﬁrms oﬀer a (one-
period) contract in each period.
We assume that ﬁrst-period contracts are non-exclusive.6 Thus, as ﬁrms
do not know the worker’s productivities in period 1, individuals may manip-
ulate the contracts in order to obtain a higher utility. For example, if ﬁrms
try to screen workers conditioning wages on the number of hours worked, in-
dividuals may deviate by moonlighting (or by trading with agents of diﬀerent
types). Thus, incentive-compatibility requires that wages in the ﬁrst period
be linear [see Hammond (1987)].
As the productivity of each worker is not known to the ﬁrms in the ﬁrst
period, they cannot distinguish between workers. In the second period, work-
ers of diﬀerent types cannot change contracts because the ﬁrm will be able to
distinguish them (i.e., second-period contracts are exclusive for individuals
with diﬀerent types).
Worker’s preferences can be represented by an additively separable, time-
independent utility function with time preference parameter 1:
U(c1) − ϕ(l1) + U(c2) − ϕ(l2), (1)
where cj and lj denote consumption and labor in period j.
We assume that U and ϕ satisfy the usual conditions for interior solutions:
4This is also obtained when production cannot be perfectly veriﬁed by a court and,
hence, the contract would not be enforceable. When production can be veriﬁed before
wages are paid, ﬁrms will typically oﬀer a menu of contracts. In order to simplify the
analysis, we will not consider such possibility in this paper.
5When only the employer observes the worker’s productivity, wages are determined
through a bargaining process. This could be introduced in this model by reinterpreting θ
i
as the wage received by a type-θ
i worker after the bargain in the second period but would
slightly change the stucture of the model since ﬁrms would have ex-post non-zero proﬁts
(thus, the ownership of ﬁrms would matter).
6This assumption is also made by Hoy and Polborn (2000) and Villeneuve (1996).
5Assumption 1 U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, lim
x→0
U′ (x) = +∞.
Assumption 2 ϕ is strictly increasing, strictly convex, lim































where interest rates are normalized to 1 and si is the amount of saving.









j}j=1,2 solve worker’s i problem given the proﬁle of wages, and
2. Wages in each period equal the expected productivity of the worker

































Equation (5) is the usual equality between the marginal rate of substi-
tution and the marginal rate of transformation (in this case the marginal
rate of transformation is 1). Equations (6) and (7) are the equality between
marginal beneﬁt of labor (right hand side) and its marginal cost (left hand
side) for periods 1 and 2, respectively.
Notice that θ
L < w1 < θ
H implies that low-productivity individuals work
more in the ﬁrst period than in the second, while high-productivity individu-
als work more in the second. This is the usual adverse selection eﬀect, where
type-θ
L workers beneﬁt from the information asymmetry by obtaining wages
higher than their productivity.
61.1 First-best solution
As in most public-ﬁnance literature, we take a utilitarian government that
maximizes the unweighted sum of each individual’s utilities. In this subsec-















i, for i = 2
.
A social planner must face the resource constraint, which states that the


















In order to write the intertemporal resource constraint above, we have
assumed that the government is able to transfer wealth between periods at
the market interest either through access to an exogenous capital market.7
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i), i = L,H, j = 1,2. (9)
Equation (8) equalizes the workers’ marginal utilities in each period.
Equation (9) states that the marginal cost of an additional time of work
(ϕ′ (li)) must equal its marginal beneﬁt (θiu′(c∗)). This condition implies
that more productive individuals should work more but consume the same
as less productive ones. Clearly, this allocation is not incentive-compatible
when workers’ productivity is not observable since type-θ
H workers would
obtain a higher utility by taking the contract of type-θ
L.
7The intertemporal resource constraint speciﬁed can also be justiﬁed by assuming the
existence of a linear storing technology. A caveat that could emerge in this case is that,
in general, we would be unable to guarantee that production will take place before con-
sumption. However, this can be avoided by assuming that individuals start with some
‘suﬃciently large’ amount of wealth (which may be interpreted as bequests). This problem
could also be avoided by specifying an overlapping-generations model, where individuals
from diﬀerent generations would be able to trade. However, this approach would deviate
us from the points we wish to analyze.
71.2 Second-best solution
In this subsection we consider the problem of choosing the optimal nonlinear
taxation when productivity is unobservable by the government.
The informational structure diﬀers from the one used in most optimal-
taxation models. While most models assume that ﬁrms are always able to
access the workers’ productivities, the present structure considers the case
where ﬁrms only observe their productivities in the second period. How-
ever, as in most models, we maintain the assumption that the government
does not observe workers’ productivities in both periods. The only variable
observed by the government is the income received by each worker. Thus,
with no loss of generality, we can restrict the search of an optimal taxation






As before, we assume that in the ﬁrst period wages are determined com-











































1 + Y H
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As shown in the appendix, the relevant incentive problem is to discourage
productive workers from getting the contract designed to unproductive ones.
Hence, the only binding incentive-compatibility constraint is the one which
prevents type-θ
H workers from getting type-θ
L workers’ contract. Then, the
second-best problem is to maximize the social welfare function subject to
the resource constraint, this incentive-compatibility constraint and equation






































































































1 + Y H
1
. (13)
Denote by λ, η, and   the multipliers associated with equations (11),
(12), and (13), respectively. Then, two ﬁrst-order conditions obtained by



























Equation (14) states that the amount of consumption obtained by type-
L workers depends on the marginal utility of resources λ and the fact that
higher consumption increases the incentive from type-H workers to deviate
(through the shadow price of the incentive-compatibility constraint η). Equa-
tion (15) aﬃrms that the consumption acquired by type-H workers depends
on the marginal utility of resources λ and the fact that higher consumption
reduces their incentive to deviate.
From these equations, it follows that an individual must consume the































Equation (16) states that three elements determine the amount of work
from type-L in the second period: his productivity parameter θ
L, the mar-
ginal utility of resources λ, and the fact that higher work relaxes the incentive
compatibility constraint. Notice this equation gives an upper bound on the













This follows from the fact that if the cost of inducing productive workers
to reveal their types exceeded the diﬀerence in productivity, it would be
better to allow them not to distinguish themselves (pool).



















9From equation (17) it follows that the amount of work from type-L in the
ﬁrst period is determined by the same elements as in the second period and
one additional element: the fact that an additional amount of labor decreases
the average productivity and, thus, the equilibrium wages w1 (general equi-
librium eﬀect). This eﬀect is proportional to the diﬀerence between average
productivity w1 and type-L’s productivity θ
L and its utility eﬀect is captured
by the shadow price  . As w1 > θ
L, it follows that the general equilibrium
eﬀect distorts downward the optimal amount of work by type-L individuals
in the ﬁrst period.
However, the overall eﬀect on labor supply is ambiguous since there is
another eﬀect coming from the fact that low productivity individuals now
earn higher wages (which decreases the amount of work necessary to raise a





















Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian with respect to Y H
2 and Y H


































The interpretation of equation (18) is analogous to that of equation (16).
The amount of work from type-H individuals in the second period is deter-
mined from his productivity, the marginal utility of resources, and the fact
that higher work increases the incentive to deviate. Moreover, substituting in
equation (15), it follows the marginal cost of working is equal to the beneﬁt
it generates to high-productivity individuals in the second period.
Equation (19) is analogous to equation (17). The diﬀerence is that both
eﬀects have opposite signs since wages are lower than type-H worker’s pro-
ductivity.
1.3 Introduction of a costless signal
In this subsection, we consider the introduction of a costless signal which
allows ﬁrms to observe the workers’ productivity in the ﬁrst period (but
which cannot be observed by the policy maker). Then, ﬁrms oﬀer wages
which equal each workers productivity in both periods. This signal can be
thought as a test, an exam or an interview.
10In the absence of government intervention, the introduction of this signal
has two eﬀects. It has a positive eﬀect on welfare by removing the adverse
selection (since workers now equate marginal cost of production to the mar-
ginal utility of consumption in both periods). However, it has a negative
impact on welfare by worsening the distribution of income. The total eﬀect
on welfare is ambiguous: it depends on the curvatures of the utility and cost
of work functions.
The following proposition formalizes that intuition.
Proposition 1 The introduction of a costless signal: (i) reduces welfare if
the labor supply in the ﬁrst period is suﬃciently inelastic, and (ii) increases
welfare if the risk-aversion coeﬃcient is suﬃciently small.









2) where x = 0 in the absence of signal and x = 1 in
the presence of signal. Let l
j
i and   l
j
i be the optimal amount of work when
signaling is and is not allowed, respectively. Since ﬁrst-period labor supply




1 , for all j,j′.

































As second-period wages are given by the worker’s productivity in both
cases, it follows that li
2 and ˜ li














































Then, from (20), we will be able to obtain the desired result.
Deﬁne U0 and U1 as the utility obtained when supplying the amount of
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1 ) − v(l
H
2 )],
11where we have used the fact that each type will choose the same consumption
in the two periods.
It is easy to see that cL
1 < cH













1 from the fact that the ﬁrst-period labor supply




















which is strictly positive from the strict concavity of u.
(ii) When risk-aversion is zero, the utility function can be written as
u(x) = Kx,
for some K > 0.
When the signal is allowed (w1 = θ






But, in this case, equations (8) and (9), which characterize the ﬁrst-best





Thus, the competitive equilibrium coincides with the ﬁrst-best solution.






Then, as w1  = θ
i and the ﬁrst-best solution is unique (from the strict
concavity of the welfare function), it follows that the welfare is increased by
the introduction of the signal.  . . .
As argued in Section 1.1, the ﬁrst-best solution would involve a type-
speciﬁc lump-sum taxation and the equalization of the marginal costs of pro-
duction among workers. However, these policies are not incentive-compatible.
Then, the second-best solution distorts the amount of work from each in-
dividual as a mean for achieving redistribution. The intuition for this result
is straightforward: the initial amount of distorting taxes has a second-order
eﬀect on eﬃciency but, as long as the economy has concerns about distribu-
tion, changes on income distribution have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on welfare.
12Our next proposition establishes that an optimized economy with con-
cerns about income distribution will always prohibit unproductive signals.
The proof consists of showing that the same allocation implemented in the
case where signals are allowed can be implemented when signals are prohib-
ited. Moreover, the incentive-compatibility constraint is no longer binding,
implying that higher welfare can be reached.
Proposition 2 When the government is taxing optimally, the introduction
of the signal is always welfare decreasing.






i=1,2 be the solution to the optimal non-linear tax-







i=1,2 . First, we will show that when signals are forbidden, the same
allocation is also feasible.
When signals are forbidden, wages in the ﬁrst period are equal to the
average productivity. Hence, the income obtained with the same amount of
labor in the ﬁrst period is given by
  Y
j









As the amount of labor in this case is the same as when signals are
permitted, it is clear that {˜ c
j




i=1,2 satisﬁes the resource constraint.
Next, we will show that {˜ c
j




i=1,2 is incentive-compatible when signals
are forbidden and that the incentive-compatibility constraint is no longer
binding.
Suppose that the incentive-compatibility constraint does not hold or holds
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H will choose to supply the following amount of labor in
the ﬁrst period:



































H will strictly prefer the contract designed for type-
θ






i=1,2 solves the optimal
non-linear taxation problem when signals are allowed.  . . .
The intuition for this result is that prohibiting signals redistributes wealth
fromhigh-skilled tolow-skilled workers independently of theirbehavior. Thus,
it enables the government to redistribute some wealth in a nondistorcive way.
Furthermore, equalizing ﬁrst-period wages reduces the high-skilled workers’
informational rent since the utility obtained when getting the low-skilled
workers’ contract is diminished.
2 The Model with a Comparative Advantage
Signal
In this Section, we consider how signals may aﬀect welfare through the ﬁrms’
technological decisions. Thus, instead of focusing on signals that reveal dif-
ferent productivities among workers for the same technology, we analyze how
signals may reﬂect workers’ productivities in diﬀerent technologies.
Consider an economy composed of an equal amount of two types of work-
ers, denoted 1 and 2, and many ﬁrms with two distinct technologies, 1 and
2. Technologies can be costlessly changed in each period.
A type-1 worker has productivity θ > 0 when working under technology
1 and a type-2 worker has productivity θ + ε under technology 2. Hence, if
ﬁrms cannot verify each worker’s type and wages cannot be conditional on
production, each worker will announce to be of type 2.
If a ﬁrms chooses technology i ∈ {1,2} and hires a type-j worker such
that j  = i, it incurs in a misallocation cost c > 0. Thus, a type-i worker is
more productive when the ﬁrm implements the type-i technology.
In order to focus on the eﬀect of diﬀerent comparative advantages alone,
we assume that workers have similar productivities. Hence, we assume that
ε > 0 is suﬃciently small.
As in previous sections, ﬁrms may learn the worker’s type through some
costless signal. In this case, signals can be interpreted as specializations in
diﬀerent areas (an accountant and a designer, for example).
When signals are prohibited, ﬁrms must oﬀer the same wages to both
types of workers. Then, a ﬁrm will choose to implement technology j in the
ﬁrst period if, and only if, the probability of hiring a type-j worker is higher
than the probability of hiring a type-i worker, i  = j. Hence, the optimal












1 is the amount of labor supplied by a type-i individual in period 1.8
Wages in the ﬁrst period are given by






When signals are allowed, the technology chosen by a ﬁrms is given by
1 if the worker is type 1,
2 if the worker is type 2.
Then, wages are wi
1 = θ > w1, i = 1,2. As, for any given labor supply,
the income of both workers is higher when signals are allowed, it is obvious
that welfare is higher in this case. Indeed, introducing signals is not only
welfare increasing but also Pareto-increasing. We summarize this result in
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When a ﬁrm must choose between diﬀerent technologies and
workers have heterogeneous comparative advantages, the introduction of sig-
nals is always welfare increasing.
Proof. When the signal is allowed, all the workers will earn the same
wage: θ. Therefore, the ﬁrst-best allocation is achieved. Furthermore, when
the signal is forbidden, every worker will receive a wage equal w1 < θ in the
ﬁrst period (and equal to θ in the second period). Hence, everyone is worse
than in the ﬁrst-best solution.  . . .
3 Extensions
3.1 The Model with a Productive Signal
In this subsection, we consider the same economy as in Section 1 except
for the assumption that signals not only reveal but also augment a worker’s
8This follows from the fact that ε is suﬃciently small and could be stated in a more
precise (but perhaps less intuitive) way as follows. Take the sequence {εn}, where εn > 0
for all n and limεn = 0. Let Tn denote the optimal technological choice for each n. Then,
{Tn} converges to equation (22).
15productivity. The usual interpretation is that of a schooling decision, where
the history of a student’s academic life not only reveals his type but also en-
hances his productivity. One can also think about these signals as employer-
sponsored health-care programs, which not only reveal information about the
worker’s health situation but also augments his productivities.
We assume that the productive signal is provided in a ﬁxed amount and
enhances productivity at rate β. Thus, the productivity of a type-θ
j worker
after receiving the ﬁxed amount of signal is (1 + β)θ
j. We also maintain the
assumption that schooling reveals a worker’s productivity.
In this case, banning the signal would imply in an eﬃciency loss since it
would reduce the amount of aggregate income. However, as in the unproduc-
tive signals case, it would allow a more equal wealth distribution. Thus, the
usual trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity emerges (although in a diﬀerent
context).
If the signal is suﬃciently productive, the eﬃciency loss will be high.
Hence, it will be optimal to allow signaling. However, if it is suﬃciently un-
productive, it will be optimal to ban signals (in the limit, we obtain the result
from Section 1.3). This result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 There exists a   β ∈ (0, θH−θL
θ1 ) such that when the government
is taxing optimally:
i. the introduction of the signal is welfare increasing if β >   β, and
ii. the introduction of the signal is welfare decreasing if β <   β.
Proof. Proposition 2 implies that in the case of β = 0, forbidding the
signal improves welfare. From the Maximum Theorem, it follows that the
“indirect social utility” is continuous, implying that prohibiting the signal is
optimal when β lies in a neighborhood of zero.
Clearly, welfare is a constant function of β when signals are forbidden.
In order to show that it is strictly increasing in β when signals are allowed,
let β
1 > β






i=1,2 be the corresponding optimal allocation when
β = β
0. This allocation is also implementable when β = β
1, and production







1 +˜ lH)] > 0. Hence, the resource
constraint is no longer binding, implying that welfare can be increased.
Finally, when β = θH−θL
θL , permitting signals implies that a type-θ
L worker
will have productivity θ
H. Hence, the welfare must be higher than when
signals are not allowed.
Thus, as welfare when signals are allowed is a continuous strictly increas-
ing function of β, it follows that the introduction of signals increases welfare
if and only if β >   β.  . . .
16Hence, the determination of which signals are desired is intrinsically re-
lated to their productivity. Signals that have low productivity-enhancing
components are welfare reducing while those with high productivity-enhancing
components are welfare increasing.
In this model, we have assumed that signals are costless. However, pro-
ductive signals are usually costly. It must be clear from the proof 4 that
the result also holds when signals are costly. The only diﬀerence is that the
threshold   β would be higher.
3.2 The Model with Mixed Signals
We can summarize the conclusions on the desirability of signals by consider-
ing an economy with a mixed signal. Thus, instead of revealing information
only on productivity or comparative advantage, we allow both pieces of in-
formation to be reﬂected in the same signal.
In practice, most signals convey some information on productivity and
some on comparative advantage. For example, a degree from a well-known
university reveals information not only about a worker’s comparative advan-
tages but also his productivity.
As in Section 2, we consider an economy with two distinct technologies,
1 and 2. There is an equal amount of three types of workers, 1, 2, and
3. A type-i worker has productivity θ
H when working under technology
i ∈ {1,2}. If a ﬁrm chooses technology i ∈ {1,2} and hires a worker with
type j ∈ {1,2} such that j  = i, it incurs in a misallocation cost c > 0. Hence,
individuals with types i ∈ {1,2} have characteristics which allow them to be
more productive under technology i.
A type-3 worker has productivity θ
L < θ
H under both technologies. Thus,
type-3 workers have lower productivity than type-i workers under the appro-
priate technology, i ∈ {1,2}.
The present framework generalizes the models from Sections 1 and 2. As
in Section 2, the technological choice determines the productivity of workers
with types 1 and 2. As in Section 1, the productivity of workers is also
determined from their intrinsic characteristics.
The game is structured in the following way. In each period, ﬁrms choose
their technology and oﬀer a wage conditional on the available information.
Then, workers decide how many hours to work and how much to consume.
In the case where signals are allowed, each worker earns his productivity
in both periods and there is no misallocational cost. When signals are not
allowed, ﬁrst-period wages are equal to the expected productivity of the













and second-period wages equal the worker’s productivity.
Banning signals implies in incurring the misallocation cost and the ad-
verse selection cost but also implies in the welfare gain from redistributing
income. Then, if the misallocation cost is suﬃciently high, it follows that this
policy is welfare decreasing. This result is stated formally in the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 There exists a   c ∈ (0,6
√
2σ (θ)) such that when the govern-
ment is taxing optimally:
i. the introduction of the signal is welfare increasing if c >   c and
ii. the introduction of the signal is welfare decreasing if c <   c,
where σ(θ) is the standard deviation of θ.
Proof. When there is no misallocation cost (c = 0), this model is iden-
tical to the one presented in Section 1, where there is a productivity signal.
Hence, fromProposition 2, introducing the signal is welfare decreasing. Then,
from the continuity of the welfare function, this also holds in a neighborhood
of c = 0.
Proof. Clearly, welfare is a strictly decreasing function of c when signals
are forbidden. Furthermore, as no ﬁrm will ever incur in the misallocation
cost when signals are allowed, welfare is constant in c in that case.
Thus, showing that introducing the signal is welfare increasing for some
c > 0 concludes the proof. Take c = 4(θ
H − θ
H). Then, from equation (??),
it follows that the avarage productivity of the economy in both periods will
be no greater than θ
L. Hence, welfare is increased by the introduction of the




2σ (θ).  . . .
 . . .
It is clear from the proposition above that when uncertainty about the
productivity of workers is suﬃciently low, it is optimal to allow signals. Anal-
ogously, when the cost of misallocation is suﬃciently low, it is optimal to for-
bid signals. Hence, there is a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency: banning
information redistributes income but generates an allocational distortion.
18Proposition 5 contrasts with the eﬃciency result of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971). This result states that the economy should be on the production
frontier under non-linear taxation. In this model, however, it may be optimal
to move ﬁrms away from the production frontier (through the prohibition of
signals), implying that their result does not hold.
The eﬃciency result breaks down in this model due to the presence of
general equilibrium eﬀects [Naito (1999)]. In this model, information can be
seen as ﬁrms’ input. Reducing some of the available information, moves the
economy away from the production frontier but also relaxes the incentive-
compatibility constraint. Thus, when the eﬃciency loss generated by such
policy is not too big (c <   c), it is optimal not to work on the production
frontier.
3.3 Discussion
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that signals are costless. Neverthe-
less, the revelation of information is usually costly. When signals are costly,
the beneﬁt of banning information is increased (since it saves resources).
Thus, it remains optimal to ban information about productivity in this case.
However, if the cost of signaling is suﬃciently large, it may be optimal to
ban information about comparative advantage.
The technology and the informational structure of the models presented
is very particular. It consists of an extreme case where ﬁrms know nothing
about the workers in the ﬁrst period and have full knowledge in the second
period. Firms are not able to infer the characteristics of workers in the ﬁrst
period because contracts are non-exclusive (individuals may change their
contract with other types of workers). Then, as shown by Hammond (1987),
workers would be able to deviate through “unoﬃcial” markets if wages were
not linear.
The informational structure presented could be extended in two natural
ways: gradual learning and exclusive contracts. The introduction of graduate
learning is straightforward and does not change the result of this paper as
long as one maintains the assumption that identical workers (from the ﬁrms’
perspective) cannot be denied to change contracts (i.e., identical workers’
contracts are non-exclusive).
If ﬁrst-period contracts were exclusive, ﬁrms would be able to screen
workers through non-linear wages. The welfare eﬀects of banning information
in this case would depend on the distribution of informational rents among
types. If low-productivity individuals have an incentive to deviate (as in
the autarky case), the prohibition of information would redistribute wealth
through informational rents. In such case, the prohibition of productivity
19signals would be welfare increasing just as in the model of Section 1. However,
if high-productivity individuals are the ones obtaining informational rents,
the prohibition of information would be welfare decreasing since it would
concentrate wealth. These possibilities suggest the extension of the models
to the case where contracts are exclusive. In such circumstance, the optimal
taxation problem can be modelled through a common agency game since
workers face two principals: a ﬁrm and the government.
4 Conclusion
Economists usually argue in favor of policies that reduce informational asym-
metries in order to increase welfare. Examples of such policies include allow-
ing ﬁrms to: impose mandatory health exams, apply IQ or any other tests, or
require any information related to a prospective worker’s education. These
signals allow the ﬁrm to access a worker’s characteristics which are not di-
rectly observable.
In this paper, we consider two distinct types of signals which reveal in-
formation relevant for the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst type reveals information about
the productivity of workers with similar comparative advantages (produc-
tivity signals). These are the signals usually considered in the job-market
signaling literature and include health exams or IQ tests. The other type re-
veals information about the comparative advantages of workers with similar
productivities (comparative advantage signals).
We show that it is always optimal to ban productivity signals when the
government is able to tax income non-linearly. This follows from the fact that
hiding this information transfers wealth from more productive individuals to
less productive ones more eﬃciently. Thus, the introduction of an ineﬃciency
in the job market reduces the distortion caused on optimal taxes due to
asymmetric information. This result is closely related to the second-best
arguments of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956):
The general theorem for the second best optimum states that
if there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a con-
straint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian con-
ditions, the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable,
are, in general, no longer desirable.
When productivity signals enhance the productivity of the workers (as
education and employer-sponsored health-care, for example), banning ﬁrms
from accessing that information is optimal if, and only if, the productivity
enhancing component is suﬃciently low.
20We also show that it is never optimal to prohibit comparative advantage
signals since they do not redistribute wealth but imply an eﬃciency loss (and,
thus, reduce aggregate income).
In general, most signals convey two pieces of information: one about
the intrinsic productivity of an individual, and one about his comparative
advantages. In this case, prohibiting ﬁrms to access such information is
welfare increasing (decreasing) in and only if the productivity component is
suﬃciently high (low).
Our results suggest that, when the government is taxing optimally, al-
lowing ﬁrms to impose tests that do not signiﬁcantly enhance a worker’s
productivity is welfare decreasing. These tests include health exams, IQ and
non-cognitive tests, and the GED, for example. Nevertheless, prohibiting
ﬁrms from accessing information such as worker’s profession and specializa-
tion is welfare decreasing since it consists mostly of comparative advantage
information.
A Appendix
The proof that the only binding incentive-compatibility constraint is the one
from type-θ
H will be presented through a series of lemmata. The incentive-





































Denote by λ, η,  , and ξ the multipliers associated with equations (11),
(12), (13), and (23), respectively. The ﬁrst lemma shows that if both con-
straints hold with equality, then all workers produce the same amount of
output in the second period.












































































































Suppose that Y L
2  = Y H



















































2]dθds = 0 (28)
which implies in Y H
2 = Y L
2 .  . . .
The following lemma states that both incentive-compatibility constraints
cannot bind.
Lemma 2 Both incentive-compatibility constraints cannot bind in the solu-
tion to the second-best problem.
Proof. Suppose that both incentive-compatibility constraints bind. Then,
from Lemma 1, it follows that Y H
2 = Y L
2 = Y2.
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1 + ξ − η
>
λ
1 − ξ + η
⇒ η > ξ.
22Consider the increase in cH and Y H in the same proportion. Then, the






















In the incentive-compatibility constraint of type-θ











































1 − ξ + η
+
λ
1 + ξ − η
￿
> 0.
Thus, both incentive-compatibility constraints and the resource constraint
remain valid and one of the binding constraint is relaxed (and the welfare is
not changed). Hence, both incentive-compatibility constraints cannot bind
in the solution.  . . .
The next lemma states that the incentive-compatibility constraint of type-
θ
L cannot be the only binding incentive-compatibility constraint.
Lemma 3 The incentive-compatibility constraint of type-θ
L cannot be the
only binding constraint.
Proof. Suppose that only the incentive-compatibility constraint from
type-θ
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Thus, the incentive-compatibility constraint of type-θ
H does not hold.
 . . .
Thus, we are now able to prove the following Proposition:
23Proposition 6 The only binding incentive-compatibility constraint is type-
θ
H’s constraint.
Proof. Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 imply that, if an incentive-compatibility con-
straint binds at the second-best solution, this must be type-θ
H′s constraint.
Then, the fact that the (unique) ﬁrst-best solution is not incentive-compatible
concludes the proof.  . . .
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